



**SOME THOUGHTS
ON THE
FINDINGS OF
JEAN MONNET CHAIR COAWARE**

Chair Coordinator's Analysis

Jean Monnet Chair COAWARE was created with the main purpose of raising awareness about the EU, its policies, impact on third countries, norms and values. Several lectures were given in İstanbul 29 Mayıs University by the Chair Co-ordinator; some by the other members of the team. The Chair organised several seminars, guest lectures, lectures in high schools and universities other than where the Chair is located and three big conferences at the end of each year to accomplish that main purpose. The Chair's activities were very visible through the posts on social media; in Twitter, Instagram and Facebook.

Some of the participants in the conferences contributed to this small e-book with their thoughts and ideas about several aspects of the EU, its relationship with third countries and future developments. The e-book's main attempt was to make the findings of the Chair even more visible which can be distributed to the public more easily.

As a conclusion, I can say through my role as the coordinator of the Jean Monnet Chair COAWARE that the Chair accomplished its main purpose of bringing into attention the main aspects of the EU and how it can influence the third parties, especially Turkey, positively. Thus, it sheds a light on potential co-operation efforts for a more successful future together especially in the current period of instability.

Prof. Dr. Özgür Ünal Eriş

Jean Monnet Chair COAWARE

2020-2023

İstanbul, Türkiye

Emil J. Kirchner

University of Essex

The Changing Context of EU-China Relations

Historically, EU-China relations have largely developed in a spirit of partnership, emphasising mutual benefits, especially in economic terms. Dominant EU liberal trade influences together with an emphasis on the notion of ‘civilian power’, or what Manners, (2002) has termed ‘normative power’, have fostered this spirit of partnership. From the EU side, it was imbued with the belief that increased economic interactions would lead to democratic and political reforms and that multilateralism would become common practice in China. While largely failing in its political reform aims and to some extent on its effective multilateralism aims, the EU has established strong economic interactions and cooperation with China on non-traditional security aspects, such as on cyber security and energy security.

Nonetheless, the notion of ‘partnership’ is undergoing change. The change itself is largely connected with the EU realisation that extensive EU-China economic interdependence also bears risks, a factor which emerged most prominently during the Covid crisis. But there are also other factors of EU concern which began to emerge during the 2010s (Christiansen et al., 2019). Among these were fears over China’s autocratic development, especially with regard to human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong, its aggressive maritime behaviour in the East and South China Sea (for example, building huge artificial islands on some of the reefs and deploying large numbers of ships), its continued pressure on Taiwan, its imperilling of the safe passage of seaborne trade in the Pacific and Indian Ocean, its 16+1 initiative with a group of Central and Eastern European countries,¹ and its revisionist attack on the rules-based international order, including democratic principles and multilateral aspects.

¹Membership has changed since its foundation in 2012, with Greece joining in 2019, Lithuania leaving in 2021 over a dispute with China involving the establishment of a trade representative office in Taiwan, and with Estonia and Latvia exiting in 2022 in the wake of China’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Belatedly, the EU began to respond to China's geo-economic and geopolitical developments, starting with the Global Strategy publication of 2016, which sought to "expand partnerships in Asia, including on security" with countries like Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea (EEAS, 2017:37/38), and the European Commission's paper on China, which, simultaneously described China as a partner, a competitor and a systemic rival (European Commission, 2019). The systemic rival reference gained further credence during the Covid crisis in 2020, when China used the supply of life-saving products (personal protective equipment and medicines) for political leverage, threatening the health security of EU citizens (De Ville 2022, p.73). In the process, not only did China fail to provide a transparent picture of the cause and fatalities associated with the Covid outbreak in Wuhan, undermining its position as a dependable stakeholder in global (health) governance, it also engaged in a disinformation campaign, discrediting EU efforts in abetting the pandemic. Further detrimental Chinese supply measures in the post-Covid recovery period indicated that China was working to acquire coercive leverage, not only in the health sector, but also in other vital sectors of the economy such as semiconductor manufacturing and other high-tech inputs to the global economy (Zelikow et al., 2020).

Of particular concern is the high dependency on Chinese semiconductor manufacturing, which is a strategic asset for key industrial value chains. Should a Chinese takeover of Taiwan happen, the dependency on Chinese chips would increase still further, as Taiwan is one of the leading global chip producers. Beside fears of potential Chinese dependency on high tech products, coming after the painful experience, especially by Germany, of over-reliance on Russian gas, the EU also wants to avoid losing out in the technological race with China, and the effect that it could have on the setting of global standards in this field. In response to this challenge the proposed European Chips Act seeks to achieve a share of global production capacity of 20 per cent by 2030 (European Commission, 2022). Moreover, to reduce dependency on foreign supplies generally, the EU intends to introduce the Critical Raw Material Act, which seeks to identify products in a number of sectors as risky (e.g., batteries, active pharmaceutical ingredients, hydrogen, semiconductors, and cloud and edge technologies); China dominates almost all rare earth metal markets.

In an effort to keep out state-backed foreign companies from public procurement tenders and to protect Europe's strategic assets, the EU has started to screen foreign direct investment (FDI) by adopting a FDI Screening Regulation (Council, 2019) whereby the

European Commission and the Member States can coordinate their actions on foreign investments. The legislation imposes no binding requirements or limitations on FDI in Europe but marks a clear shift in the EU's free trade policy and highlights Europe's growing determination to support a more level playing field vis-à-vis China (Brattberg and Corre, 2022). Furthermore, by seeking to strengthen its trade defence instruments, the European Commission published in December 2021 a proposal for its Anti-Coercion Instrument, developed to combat coercive economic practices by countries like China (Council, 2022) .

The EU has also responded with a wider spectrum of non-traditional security and traditional military security means, largely to meet threats emanating from the geopolitically contested Indo Pacific region, which, as stated in the EUSCI, are directly impacting on the EU's interest (Council, 2021). In this respect, the EU has been successful, at least to some extent, in establishing bilateral and multilateral arrangements covering climate change, cyber security, terrorism and energy security (Christiansen et al., 2021) and complemented these through an array of connectivity and security partnerships with Asian partners (Kirchner, 2022). The EU also has made strides, largely through the role of Member States, in advancing military security measures more directly through the mounting of a (modest) naval presence in the Indo Pacific. However, a successful undertaking of these objectives is likely to require coordination with the US, details of which have not yet been fully realised. It also requires greater EU political unity which, however, has so far been in short supply on many issues of principle, such as freedom of navigation in the East and South China Sea, human rights, or relations with Taiwan, sometimes weakened by Chinese pressure on individual Member States (Smith and Taussig, 2019). To improve EU actorness also requires higher defence spending by Member States, which will be helpful in responding to Russia's threat to European security, and is happening to some extent, but not yet sufficiently to significantly reduce US defence commitments to Europe and/or considerably enhance its role as a security actor in Asia. It also leaves as of yet unanswered the key geostrategic question of how the EU concerns its readiness and ability to think strategically about China.

Changes in EU perceptions about China and its influence on EU-Asia security relations are also connected to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which carry geo-economic and geopolitical implications. In the Asian context, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has had two distinct effects. First, it has affected EU relations with Asian states more generally, with several, including India, abstaining from UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Russia and hence

undermining EU influence with these states. Second, it has strengthened China-Russia cooperation. By expressing understanding of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China, in the view of Mayer-Resinde, has put itself on the side of the aggressor — making a mockery of principles it highlights as Chinese policy, such as non-interference, harmony and peace (Mayer-Resinde, 2022).

While increasing Sino-Russian collaboration is affecting EU-China security relations, a yet greater impact derives from growing Sino-American confrontations. While the EU shares with the US concerns on strategic matters such as over China's military ambitions and assertiveness in the East and South China Sea, and while accepting that joint US-EU actions are necessary in dealing with the rise of China, the EU differs on the extent to which it should support US calls for containing China economically, politically and militarily. Given the key position China holds as an economic partner, trading more than €2.3 billion worth of goods and services every day, the EU is willing to reduce dependence on China, but not to cut trade drastically. However, there are also other, and to some extent countervailing, considerations which might affect transatlantic cooperation. Among these are potential linkages between US contributions to the Ukraine war effort and US demands for greater European support in its efforts to contain China. Moreover, it would appear politically unrealistic for Europe to maintain business as usual if China invaded Taiwan. As Europe's security guarantor, the US could force the EU to choose sides.

There clearly are major challenges ahead of relations between the EU and China, and whether there can be a deepening of cooperation, especially in sensitive areas such as technology, will depend not only on the strategic choices that either side is willing to make but also on the existing external environment in which these relations develop, not least with regard to the policies of the United States and Russia.

Xavier Nuttin

Senior Associate and Advisory Board Member, European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), Brussels, Belgium

Vice-Chair, Board of Directors, Parliamentary Centre for Asia (PCAsia), Phnom Penh, Cambodia

The European Union as a Global Player : In Search of an EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy

As the distinguished previous speakers have made clear, we live in turbulent times. I believe that a key question for the EU's future is: does it fully appreciate the changes that are taking place and how does it react/adapt to this new world order to become a global player which is key to defend its governance model for the sake of the well-being of the European citizens?

As a Union of close to half a billion citizens, with high GDP per capita, the EU potential is unparalleled. It is also clear, though, that we are not making full use of this potential yet and the EU still has to demonstrate how, faced with its own internal difficulties it can become such a global and influent player. For this it obviously needs to assert itself politically.

I will concentrate on the relations the EU has developed with Asia or, as many say today, the Indo-Pacific region, as the interdependence between Europe and Asia has reached very significant levels. This is largely due to the dramatic changes that took place in the last 25 years during which Asia has emerged as the world's fastest growing region.

Many analysts have defined the 21st century as being Asia's century and the continent has become central to global prosperity and security and to the EU's own growth prospects (Asia has become the main trading partner of the European Union).

According to Kishore Mahbubani, Diplomat from Singapore and former dean of the LKYSPP, "*Europe is the past, Asia is the future*". I hope he is wrong. But to make him wrong, EU action is urgently needed.

But for the EU to be a global player, relations must go beyond trade and investment and include global challenges as well as security issues.

There is a need to integrate the strong EU's economic engagement with a more visible political presence and raise this to a level commensurate with the weight of a Union made of 27 Member States. A vast majority of the European citizens understand that there is a need for the EU to take responsibility for a greater role in the world. This requires a shared vision.

Already in September 2010 the European Council agreed on the need to promote the EU interests and values more assertively and insisted on the need for "*reciprocity*".

It is in this framework that the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy was launched in 2016. It is an important step forward that provides a new vision for the future role of the EU in a changing world and stresses the importance of strategic autonomy and defence issues.

But the change in the world is not only geographical (from West to East), it also puts into question the Western liberal order that has led the world since the second World War. In the nineties there was an assumption that the world is bound to adopt the Western liberal democracy model. Thirty years on, liberal democracy, human rights and democratic values are increasingly being questioned and challenged in many countries across the globe by authoritarian types of government.

Beyond the Global Strategy, and building on it, the EU has embarked on the definition of a series of geographical and thematic strategies in order to clarify the general vision, its strategic interests and define the ways and means to attain those objectives. Among them the "*EU-China – a Strategic Outlook*" (March 2019) and the "*Enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia*" (May 2018).

More recently (April 2021) the EU has adopted an *EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific*, a rather recent concept covering a vast region stretching from the East coast of Africa to the Pacific islands. This Strategy recommitments the EU politically to the region with the aim of contributing to its stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development, based on the promotion of democracy, rule of law, human rights and international law. It specifically starts by mentioning that the EU should reinforce its strategic focus, presence and actions in the Indo-Pacific.

To establish strategic partnerships with key players is good. To define strategies to translate a vision is fine. But it is not sufficient.

Herman Van Rompuy famously said one day: "*We have strategic partnerships now we need strategies*". If I may, I would add "*we have strategies, now we need to implement them*".

As said before the EU has a huge potential and - even if the 2008 economic crisis, Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic have for some reduced the attractiveness of the regional integration model- the EU remains a leader in many fields: good governance, economy, culture, norms setter, climate change, development aid. The toolbox is there.

But soft power is no longer sufficient. The EU has always prided itself on its soft power – and it will keep doing so because it is excellent in this field. However, the idea that Europe

is exclusively a “civilian power” does not do justice to an evolving reality. Soft and hard power must go hand in hand. Hence the debate on strategic autonomy. But there is still a long way to go to have a strong and coherent CFSP as many Member States are reluctant to give up their historical control on foreign policy and prefer to play the national card rather than the common interest. Key to success will be the capacity of the EU to come forward with a unified response. Indeed, none of the EU countries has the strength nor the resources to address global threats alone.

So what about Asia and the Indo-pacific region?

The paper on “Enhanced EU security cooperation IN and WITH Asia” adopted in 2018 opens the door to an entirely new field of cooperation: several shared security challenges are identified (maritime security, cyber security, nuclear proliferation, terrorism and violent extremism) in but also outside Asia (hence the importance to mention WITH Asia).

This is a most welcome step as it says clearly that the EU has a fundamental interest in cooperating with Asian partners beyond trade relations, to safeguard its citizens, defend the fundamental values upon which the EU is founded and secure the EU’s economic interests.

In the new *Strategy on Cooperation with the Indo-Pacific* the EU notes with concern the current dynamics in the Indo-Pacific that have given rise to intense geopolitical competition adding to increasing tensions on trade and supply chains as well as in technological, political and security areas. It considers that these developments threaten the stability and security of the region and beyond, directly impacting on the EU’s interests. And recommends that Europe and Asia must also work together now to implement the global agenda.

The reality however, and despite Asia growing importance and those nice statements, is that it remains difficult for the EU to keep Asia on top of the agenda due to other priorities and crisis in and near the EU which leave little space, time and energy for developing stronger and deeper links with a far-away region: while it is recognized that the EU needs to make a greater contribution to Asian security, the strategy clearly says: “*engagement further afield - from the near neighbourhood- will be on a case by case basis*”.

That confirms that despite the direct connection between European prosperity and Asian development, Asia is not yet a clear priority for the EU and a “grand strategy” still is work in progress. This partly explains why, for the time being, expectations by Asians from the EU at the political and security levels remain rather low.

To play a bigger role in the region the EU needs to express a stronger political will and to address its current lack of credibility (beyond a trade partner). Credibility can be achieved through a clear stance, based on clear EU strategic interests, on issues important to Asian

countries and with sufficient means to accompany the statements. Being able to deliver on commitments is vital.

This is crucial for the EU at a time when China's goal to improve its global influence in the world and promote a new type of international relations (and of great power relations) based on its own rules is a challenge to the established Western-led world order.

The EU may not be able to counterbalance the two main global players, but many Asians leaders are keen to see the EU as a counter-weight to their increasing dependence on China which clearly considers itself as the regional power. Most Asians regard the EU as a soft power with a non-threatening influence in their regional security. That should facilitate cooperation in many sectors that could enhance the EU's visibility and political profile in the region. Moreover, cooperation with Asian partners is required to implement the sustainable policies needed to address global challenges (such as climate change, terrorism, human trafficking, pandemics or migration). But for many it is also a negative comment as the EU is seen as weak if at all present beyond trade.

Promoting a secure and stable region is a key long-term EU interest which requires moving beyond the current role as economic player to become a global player. The key question is who will set the norms and rules in the years to come.

Let's hope that with all its different strategies (regional, global, security, connectivity) the EU can respond to the Asia's century and prove wrong the sombre prediction of Kishore Mahbubani.

Roman Petrov

National University of Kyiv

EU Accession of Ukraine in Time of War

Introduction

Ukraine's formal application for EU membership, on 28 February 2022, took place in tragic circumstances. It also came as a surprise to many. That President Zelensky and his government could even think about EU membership while the Russian army was invading the country on a scale comparable to that of Operation 'Barbarossa' in 1941. And yet, the formal application to the EU was signed just a few days after the unprovoked invasion of the Russian Federation to Ukraine while Russian troops were only about 15 kilometres from the President's office in Kyiv. The long-cherished dream of the Ukrainian nation to engage formally on an EU

membership course suddenly became a reality, in one of the most critical and mortal moments of the country's history.

On the one hand, the formal bid for EU membership was an act of despair by a country already at war since 2014, and now fighting for its survival. Indeed, this bold move ultimately served its purpose and considerably boosted the combatting morale of the Ukrainian nation. It also raised hopes for more military, financial and technical assistance on behalf of the EU to support Ukraine in its war effort. By any standards, the EU accession process triggered by the application unfolded with unprecedented speed. While Ukraine's bid for EU membership was immediately joined by similar bids from Moldova and Georgia, the European Commission committed itself to issuing its Opinions on the respective applications, as required by Article 49 TEU, as soon as possible.²

Indeed, by June 17th 2022, the Commission had already assessed Ukraine's ability to join the EU, in consideration of the accession conditions based the so-called "Copenhagen criteria". It concluded that "Ukraine is a European State which has given ample proof of its adherence to the values on which the European Union is founded [and] therefore recommend[ed] to the Council that Ukraine should be given the perspective to become a member of the European Union."³ Consequently, the Commission also recommended to European Council to grant Ukraine the much sought after "candidate status" – a label that is not formally envisaged by the procedure of Article 49 TEU, but which has become a key component of the EU enlargement taxonomy, and a milestone in the accession process. This recommendation was supplemented by the request to conduct urgent reforms within 7 sectors (judiciary, rule of law, fight against corruption, national minorities, anti-money laundering legislation, anti-oligarch legislation, media legislation in line with the EU *acquis*). The European Commission committed itself to monitor the Ukraine progress within these fields and to issue a final assessment by the end of 2022. Further, the European Commission confirmed that the Ukraine's accession process will be based on "established criteria and

² "So we will accelerate this process as much as we can, while ensuring that all conditions are respected." Statement by President von der Leyen with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy at the occasion of the President's visit to Kyiv, 08 April 2022, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/news/statement-president-von-der-leyen-ukrainian-president-zelenskyy-occasion-presidents-visit-kyiv-2022-04-08_en.

³ Commission Opinion on Ukraine's application for membership of the European Union, Brussels, 17.06.2022, COM(2022) 407 final.

conditions”. Thus, it confirms that the Copenhagen Criteria will remain crucial for the progress of the Ukraine’s accession.

Although less favourable, the Commission’s Opinions on the other two applications of Moldova and Georgia, respectively, came to the same conclusion: the two countries were given a perspective to become Member States of the Union.⁴ The European Council endorsed the Commission recommendations only a few days later and recognized the European perspective for both Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, acknowledging that “The future of these countries and their citizens lies within the European Union”. The candidate country status was granted only to Ukraine and Moldova, however, Georgia being asked to address the priorities of domestic reform indicated in the Commission’s Opinion first to obtain the status of “candidate country”.⁵

Challenges of the Ukrainian Road to the EU Membership

Ukraine’s road towards EU membership will not be a trivial resemblance of the accession experience of the EU’s old and new Member States. It is because, ‘Ukraine became the first country to apply for EU membership in the middle of a war that had been started by invasion of it by another state with which the EU still has a functioning bilateral partnership and cooperation agreement’.⁶ There are other challenges to be considered on Ukraine’s road towards EU membership. First, is whether the comprehensive EU-Ukraine Association Agreement could remain a solid and relevant foundation of Ukraine’s accession procedure. In this regard, experts advocate that the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement still has considerable potential and therefore, can be regarded as a perfect ‘stepping-stone towards EU membership’.⁷ Second, the Ukrainian case requires the reconsideration of the accession procedure due to the imminent and escalating cost of war. Ukrainian officials call for either a ‘fast-track’ procedure for Ukraine or for the ‘special procedure’ for Ukraine’s application ‘without the strains of

⁴ Commission Opinion on Moldova’s application for membership of the European Union, Brussels, 17.06.2022, COM(2022) 406 final. Commission Opinion on Georgia’s application for membership of the European Union, Brussels, 17.06.2022, COM(2022) 405 final.

⁵ European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 24 June 2022, EUCO 24/22.

⁶ A. Tatham, Op-Ed: “Conflict between Rhetoric and Reality of Enlargement: The Implications of Opening EU Accession Negotiations with Ukraine”, EU Law Live, 5 April 2022, <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-conflict-between-rhetoric-and-reality-of-enlargement-the-implications-of-opening-eu-accession-negotiations-with-ukraine-by-allan-f-tatham>.

⁷ P. Van Elsuwege, G. Van der Loo, Op-Ed: “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement as a Stepping-stone towards EU Membership?”, EU Law Live, 28 March 2022, <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-the-eu-ukraine-association-agreement-as-a-stepping-stone-towards-eu-membership-by-peter-van-elsuwege-and-guillaume-van-der-loo>.

mistrust and the failure of conditionality'.⁸ Third, the substantive and procedural rules of the future accession of Ukraine to the EU must reflect the scope and objectives of a future peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. In other words, it would be an unbearable challenge for Ukraine to participate in the complicated and meticulous accession race while being engaged into resource-consuming and bloody war with Russia.

It is argued that Ukraine's ability to conduct the accession negotiations with the EU will inevitably depend on the outcome of the war, and the terms upon which hostilities eventually end. A potential war settlement will indeed define and/or confirm the geographical borders of Ukraine and could influence its sovereignty on issues related to its security and ability to join international organisations like NATO and the EU.

Concluding remarks

The invasion of the Russian Federation to Ukraine on February 24th 2022 represents an unprecedented historical momentum for the European integration project. It must be acknowledged that the EU faces the most serious existential crisis since its foundation. The Russian Federation was the first military and political superpower that openly challenged the international security order, undermined the foundations of international law by disregarding the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine, repeatedly broke the UN Charter and openly contraposed the Western and European common democratic values with self-developed notions of "sovereign democracy" and "traditional values". Ignorance of these events could run against the spirit of Article 21 TEU and would irrevocably undermine the role of the EU as a global actor. In these critical circumstances Ukraine appeared to be ready and resolute not only to fight for its survival but also protect for the ideological and political credibility of the EU on the battlefield. This unparalleled challenge pushed the EU to employ the whole arsenal of its political, economic and security tools to stop Russia from its aggressive behaviour and to do everything plausible to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine and, in the end, to restore peace on the European continent.

The end of the War in Ukraine will inevitably be finalised by the Russo-Ukrainian Peace Deal. There are several possible scenarios of the Peace Deal depending on the success on the battlefield in Ukraine. Any option except convincing victory for Ukraine would imply a

⁸ D. Kochenov, R. Janse, Op-Ed: "Admitting Ukraine to the EU: Article 49 TEU is the 'Special Procedure'", EU Law Live, 30 March 2022, <https://eulawlive.com/op-ed-admitting-ukraine-to-the-eu-article-49-teu-is-the-special-procedure-by-dimitry-kochenov-and-ronald-janse>.

constitutional reform in Ukraine. The scope of such constitutional reform may vary from revision of the status of unitary state and single official language policy to the acceptance of neutrality in foreign policy and complete demilitarisation of Ukraine. No doubt that the degree of the constitutional reform and potential limitation of the national sovereignty directly depends on convincing success of the Ukrainian Army on the battlefield and resolute support of the Western allies.

Z. Selen Artan

Marmara University

Changes in Turkish Diaspora Policy in the Wake of Labor Migration to Europe

The signing of labor exchange agreements between Turkey and several European countries, including Germany (1961), Austria (1964), Belgium (1964), Netherlands (1964), France (1965), and Sweden (1967), culminated in a large population move to Western Europe in the 1960s and the 1970s. The primary driving force behind this post-war phenomenon was economic in nature. The economic boom that coincided with Europe's reconstruction phase resulted in labor shortages and consequently generated demand for foreign workers. Meanwhile, the Turkish state's desire to send workers abroad was based on economic considerations, too. The government had three main objectives: (1) curbing soaring unemployment rates, (2) procuring foreign exchange to be channeled into Turkish economy, and (3) sustaining economic growth by utilizing the newly acquired skills of presumably returning workers. Although Turkey and European countries that signed the agreements expected these labor movements to be temporary, over time they became permanent, hence, prompting a series of amendments in Turkish state policy. Drawing on parliamentary debates and state policies, in this essay I will discuss how the state perception of Turkish nationals abroad have evolved over the years. Since there is a growing body of literature on the shifts that have taken place in Turkish migration policy after the Justice and Development Party came to power, I will focus solely on the period between the 1960s and early 2000s. I categorize this era that spans across four decades into three distinct phases: (1) the early migration period, (2) the transition period, and (3) the transnationalism period.

During the early migration period spanning the 1960s to the 1970s, the state's interest in Turkish nationals residing abroad primarily centered around economic concerns. Addressing the issue of unemployment, the initial Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967), formulated

by the State Planning Agency, emphasized the need for reducing the country's unemployment rate. Among the proposed measures was the suggestion to export surplus labor to Western European countries experiencing labor shortages. Furthermore, in the second Five-Year Development Plan (1968-1973), it was asserted that the "temporary" export of labor had alleviated concerns regarding unemployment, urging the government to continue implementing this policy. The plan also stipulated that the government would channel worker remittances back to Turkey for investment purposes. As a result, during the 1960s and the 1970s, parliamentary debates revolved around repatriating foreign currency earned by workers to Turkey and determining which investments to be prioritized. In pursuit of these objectives, the Turkish parliament enacted two significant laws. In 1964, they passed Law No. 499 on Housing and Artisan Loans and Lending Money to Workers Abroad to attract remittances to Turkey. A decade later, in 1975, they adopted the Law Authorizing the Establishment of Worker's Investment Bank with a similar intention. As the latter half of the 1960s unfolded, issues related to the political rights of workers started to surface. However, the primary concern remained economic, with proposed amendments in the legal framework pertaining to citizenship, elections, and mandatory military service being advocated primarily for the sake of securing greater economic benefits for workers.

The second phase, encompassing the 1980s, is characterized as a transition period due to its amalgamation of features from both the preceding and subsequent periods. One of the pivotal economic shifts during this period was Turkey's gradual transition from import substitution to a more liberal economic model, aimed at integrating into global networks. This transformation was reflected in government policies regarding Turkish nationals abroad. Although discussions about foreign exchange transfers continued in the parliament, their intensity waned compared to the previous period. Another significant development involved the enactment of legal amendments in three laws related to citizenship rights: the laws on citizenship, elections, and mandatory military service. Following these amendments, the Turkish state adopted dual citizenship, extended voting rights at border crossings, and reduced the duration of military service. These changes aimed to both facilitate the integration of migrants into their host countries and safeguard their national identity, while strengthening their ties to Turkey. However, despite the legal changes signaling a shift in state's perspective, certain objections persisted in the parliament during this period. While some MPs remained adamant that workers would eventually return, a parliamentary proposal to investigate the challenges experienced by immigrants towards integration into their host country was rejected.

The period of transnationalism, which began in the 1990s, mirrored concurrent developments observed in migrant-sending countries world-wide. Scholarship on transnationalism asserts that owing to technological advancements in communication and transportation, migrants no longer sever their ties with their home countries when they move, but instead engage in “transnational” activities where they move back and forth between multiple nation-states. While the Turkish state continued to focus on remittances during this period, it also began to take note of the enhanced socio-economic circumstances of immigrants in Europe. Concurrently, the issue of nurturing the allegiances of immigrants with Turkey gained paramount importance compared to earlier periods. In the parliament, there was a recurring emphasis on the potential political influence of immigrants, such as their lobbying power, to further Turkey’s political interests in Europe, particularly the EU membership bid. Hence, the question of immigrant adaptation to their host countries while retaining their cultural identity garnered greater support than in earlier periods. Moreover, the notion of “Euro-Turks” surfaced, reflecting a change in the state’s perception of immigrants who were initially characterized as “uneducated villagers,” especially during the early migration period. During this period, two significant pieces of legislation, the law on citizenship and the law on elections were amended. The former introduced the “pink card” implementation, which enabled immigrants who renounced their Turkish citizenship to retain specific rights by introducing a new legal status. Meanwhile, the latter provided the opportunity to participate in elections abroad either through ballot boxes, postal mail, and electronic voting.

Parliamentary debates indicate that state policies toward immigrants were influenced by the economic and political expectations of Turkish governments, the social conditions in European countries, and the demands voiced by immigrants. Notably, there are several instances where the state proactively took measures to improve the circumstances in Turkey and host countries. For instance, the legal amendments designed to channel foreign exchange to Turkey during the early migration period illustrate this point. Moreover, the state desire to strengthen immigrants’ sense of belonging while focusing on enhancing their lobbying power in the 1990s demonstrated deliberate efforts to exert influence in Europe for political returns. This paper illustrates that while the official perception of immigrants evolved over the years, the state was also actively engaged in pursuing economic and political gains through the policies designed for Turkish nationals living abroad.

Andreas List

Retired from European External Action Service

Stimulating Thoughts on the EU's Global Role

With a sense of realism in mind - at least what I hoped for - I presented the students with three hypotheses: First, after Corona, other crises were waiting around the corner. The EU needs to prepare for more crises and for more complex ones. (... we could not know that a year later, Russia aggressed Ukraine, shattered the post-Cold-War security architecture in Europe, and triggered a war that still today ravages in Europe). Second, the EU was a global player with democratic legitimacy, advocating a reasonable set of values. It would be foolish NOT to strengthen the Union's global role. And, third, the EU needed institutional and policy reforms. Sadly, our wide-spread short-sightedness stands in the way of bold reform. As a result, Corona had provoked a shock - notably for the solidarity among member States, but had certainly not provoked an existential crisis for the EU. After all, we had agreed in Brussels on a set of innovative measures, including the (one-off?) acceptance of common debts by the European Union, as part of the 750 billion euro reconstruction fund.

If the webinar during the pandemic had to be partly speculative about the future, our second webinar could not have been more pertinent. Just month before we witnessed Russia's attack on its neighbour we talked about "Difficult times in international relations - what can the EU deliver?". In hindsight a prophetic title!

I offered a few ideas. One was that, since around 1990, the world was "turning faster". This was about the accelerating speed of technological change, but also about changing roles in the international power play: the US initially benefitting from the end of the Cold War as the only remaining super-power and then retreating from their traditional role as "benevolent hegemon". At the same time the astonishing yet predictable rise of China, and the economic and political global demise of Russia. As a result, the "complexity trap" had found its way into our daily lives - the predictability of "a better future", which we had assumed a given for decades, had disappeared. More political parties than ever before in a more complex set-up than the classic left-right picture, overlapping and competing new identities, for individuals and groups, resulting in uncertainty. And that gave rise to politicians and parties advocating simple responses - the rise of populism.

If we assume that a global player is characterised by delivering international public goods, then the EU is certainly a global player - not in terms of military hardware, but in terms of providing trustworthiness, reliability notably in trade relations, in development cooperation and in humanitarian engagement. Even enlargement and migration - both hotly debated topics in the EU - prove the attractiveness of the European market economy with social features for millions of outsiders. In our debate with the students, I could see that most did follow my appeal to advocate a strengthened EU - it would be foolish not to reform the Union, to make it more efficient, more democratic and more resilient. This would logically go to the detriment of member States' competences. Yet, it is unconceivable that any one European country could deliver alone on the big issues, like security and political stability, climate change and ecology, energy, migration, and so forth. Sadly, some European leaders do not grasp the seriousness of the situation and find an easy target in segments of the population unwilling or unable to rationally structure the global picture.

In our third webinar, we discussed the "reasons to study international relations in a changing context". Since all students were enrolled in a Master class, there was no reason to get them motivated to study in the first place. Rather, we discussed the changing world order and how policies should or could be framed, based on a realist picture. Unavoidably, we brainstormed about a role for the EU, and notably about reform ideas to make the EU a stronger global player. Ideas put forward included simpler procedures in agreeing on common positions, ad hoc working groups of Member states willing to contribute on specific issues, the use of qualified majority voting in certain areas that today still require unanimity, and - dreaming of a more democratically legitimate Council - making it a Senate-type of Upper House. While treaty change is currently not in the cards, dreaming about a future role of the EU is legitimate business.

From my, admittedly limited, perspective I am impressed by prof. Özgür's performance as Jean-Monnet-Chair. Teaching a diverse group of students, encouraging them to use their own research and stimulating their critical thinking - not a minor achievement, in parallel to her own impressive research.

Başak Z. Alpan

Middle East Technical University

Turkey-EU Relations after the Elections and Reflections on the Future of Turkey-EU Relations

I guess all my colleagues will agree that it is hard to be a scholar working on European Studies in Turkey these days. There are at least two reasons for that: First of all, as we are thoroughly exploring in the Jean Monnet Network, LEAP ('Linking to Europe at the Periphery') that I am currently coordinating, we need to take into account the centre-periphery dichotomy when we talk about European integration. Centre-periphery dimension introduces geographical as well as structural disparities within the European integration, and urges us to acknowledge that the EU candidates, potential candidates as well as new member states constitute the 'periphery' of the European integration, where the periphery reinforces the dependency on the structures set by the European integration. Turkey is no exception to this scheme. Secondly, Turkey displays a unique case in terms of the EU accession mainly due to the longevity and ups and downs of the process. As academics, we need to distance ourselves from presentism, just limiting our analytical framework with everyday developments regarding Turkey's EU accession or Turkey-EU bilateral relations, as we are not journalists.

Having said that, we need to follow the recent developments closely. The pluri-crisis that the EU is going through at the moment, which had been already bruised by the Eurozone and refugee crises, is still one of the main items on the EU's agenda. The Russian aggression on Ukraine had further contributed to this crisis moment of the EU. The Spanish presidency will kick off in June against this background. Another important item on the EU agenda is the re-emergence of the enlargement policy after Ukraine and Moldova had been declared as official EU candidates recently. Enlargement was off the EU agenda for some time despite the lingering candidacies of the Western Balkan countries as well as Turkey, where both cases were treated as the elephant in the room by the EU. The candidacy status accorded to Ukraine and Moldova is also important as the dividing line between enlargement and neighborhood policies is now blurred and the EU's relations with the Eastern neighborhood is more complicated than ever.

We also need to add to this picture the prospective deepening perspective of the EU. A rethinking of the EU institutional structures has already been on the agenda for some time, whereas the Conference on the Future of Europe last year was devised to serve this purpose.

The pluri-crises I had mentioned before necessitated internal reforms, and the prospective enlargement process as well as the lack of EU mechanisms to deal with EU members such as Poland and Hungary contributed to the vast need for a Treaty reform.

Quite recently, a new European platform had been created to address to these newly emerging challenges. European Political Community (EPC), the body which aims to improve foreign and security cooperation of the Continent, bringing 27 EU member states and 17 non-EU member states, emerged thanks to the French initiative. The EPC basically aims to tackle with the recent security challenges and complexities in Europe. The launch of the EPC also overlaps with what had been called by Charles Michel as the need to design a “European geopolitical community” for the future of the continent. The relation between the EPC and EU enlargement is not clear yet. Nevertheless, the launch of the EPC clearly shows that the EU is trying to increase its global presence, which will mark the medium-term European agenda. The European Parliament elections in May 2024 and the prospect of the forthcoming set-up of the European Commission will only further the complexity of the EU agenda.

Where is Turkey in this picture? Well, Turkey-fatigue seems to continue in the EU. This summer, we heard a lot about the high Schengen visa-rejection rates experienced by Turkish citizens, which made the visa liberalisation process more urgent than ever in the eyes of the public. Moreover, Turkey is a part of the EPC and will definitely have significance in the “Geopolitical Europe” debate due its geopolitical position and importance. Time will tell how the Turkish-EU relations will unfold in the near future. Nevertheless, one thing we could be sure is that we will be hearing the term, “security” more often regarding the bilateral relations.

Bibliography

Brattberg, E. and Corre, P. (2022) 'The Case for Transatlantic Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 18. Available at <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/18/case-for-transatlantic-cooperation-in-indo-pacific-pub-80632>

Christiansen, T. Kirchner, E. and Tan, S-S. (2021) *The European Union's Security Relations with Asian Partners* (London: Palgrave Macmillan).

Christiansen, T., Kirchner, E. and Wissenbach, U. (2019) *The European Union and China*, (London, Macmillan and Red Globe Press).

Council of the European Union. (2022) 'Trade: Council agrees negotiating position on economic anti-coercion rules. November 11. Available at <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/11/16/trade-council-agrees-negotiating-position-on-economic-anti-coercion-rules/>

Council of the European Union. (2021) 'EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific - Council conclusions', April 16. Available at <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7914-2021-INIT/en/pdf>

Council of the European Union. (2019) 'Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union', March 19. Available <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-ontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019R0452>

De Ville, F. (2022) 'Global value chains and the EU-East Asia trade: An antidote for geo-economic competition?' In J. Adriaensen and E. Postnikov (eds.), *A Geo-Economic Turn in Trade Policy? : EU Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific* (London: Palgrave-Macmillan), pp. 73-94.

EEAS. (2017) 'Shared vision, common action : a stronger Europe : a global strategy for the European Union's foreign and security policy. Available at <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2871/9875>

European Commission. (2022) The European Chips Act. Available at https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/europe-fit-digital-age/european-chips-act_en

European Commission. (2019) 'EU-China Strategic Outlook', March 12, Available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en

Kirchner, E. (2022) 'EU Security Alignment with the Asia Pacific', *Asia Affairs*, Vol. 53, Issue 3, pp. 542-560.

Manners, I. (2002) 'Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 235-258.

Mayer-Resinde, M. (2022) 'China's support for Russia challenges Europe's Peace Order', *euobserver*, June 22. Available at https://euobserver.com/opinion/155297?utm_source=euobs&utm_medium=email

Smith, J. and Taussig, T. (2019, September/October) 'The Old World and the Middle Kingdom: Europe Wakes up to China's Rise', *Foreign Affairs online*.

Zelikow, P. Edelman, E., Harrison, K. and Gventer, C. (2020, July/August) 'The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft'. *Foreign Affairs online*.